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Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
Department of Health and Human Services
ATTN: CMS-9940-P
Mail Stop C4-26-05
7500 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21244-1850
Submitted by Overnight Mail
Re:
Comment on the proposed definition of “eligible organization” for purposes of Coverage
of Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act [File Code CMS-9940-P]
Date: October 20, 2014
Dear Sir or Madam:
We write to provide comments on the matter referenced above. We are law professors
who for many years have taught, written about, and spoken on corporate law subjects. All
institutional affiliation information is provided solely for identification purposes, and no
implication that any of our universities approve or agree with these comments is intended. Many
of the points set forth in this letter are elaborated on in a forthcoming article titled “Corporate
Law after Hobby Lobby,” co-authored by Lyman Johnson and Professor David Millon, to be
published in the November 2014 issue of The Business Lawyer, the flagship journal of the
American Bar Association’s Section on Business Law.

It can be accessed on SSRN at:

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2507406.

In Part I below we provide comments on your proposed rules. In Part II, because your
proposal invites suggestions, we comment on approaches that, if suggested by other commenters,

should be avoided in the rule-making process because they are not consistent with the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Hobby Lobby and are not consonant with generally applicable precepts of
state corporate law or principles of federalism.

I.

Comments on Proposed Rules
A.

In several places (see, e.g., pp. 3, 11, 13-14, 32), the background explanation and

the proposed rules themselves misdescribe the Hobby Lobby ruling. First, although the three
companies in that litigation were “closely-held,” the Court’s reasoning decidedly was not limited
to such companies. Justice Alito’s opinion acknowledged that the cases before the Court did
“not involve publicly traded corporations” and “we have no occasion in these cases to consider
RFRA’s applicability to such companies.”1 But Justice Alito did not in principle exclude public
companies as being able to assert RFRA claims, stating instead only that it was “unlikely” due to
“numerous practical restraints,” and that, for factual reasons of share ownership patterns, it was
“improbable.”2

Nowhere did the Court exclude public corporations from the universe of

companies that could assert RFRA claims and this is because the state corporate law principles
drawn on in Hobby Lobby permit all corporations – whether private or public − to exercise
religion. State law makes no distinction among corporations in that regard. Whether a particular
corporation does in fact exercise religion is a distinct matter, addressed below, but all
corporations, as a matter of state corporate law, are legally empowered to do so.

1

Hobby Lobby, 2014 WL 2921709 at *18.

2

Id.

2

The corporate treatises and corporate statutes cited by Justice Alito with respect to a
corporation’s freedom to act in a non-profit-maximizing manner, and thereby exercise religion,
are not limited in application to “closely-held” corporations,3 nor do those generally applicable
corporation statutes even refer to or somehow distinguish “closely-held” corporations.4 The
relevant statutory provisions appear in state general incorporation statutes that apply to all
corporations organized under their provisions, public as well as privately-held. Federal “exercise
of religion” claims under RFRA, as a practical matter and as Justice Alito noted, likely will be
made by close corporations, but the Court’s reasoning on the permissibility of pursuing broad,
non-commercial purposes under state corporate law, such as the exercise of religion, applies to
all companies. This necessarily is the case because under state corporate law there simply is no
basis for contending that general state incorporation statutes − and judicial interpretations of
them − do not apply categorically to all corporations, except where the statute itself provides
otherwise.5 Thus, there is no principled basis for construing the Hobby Lobby Court’s views on
corporate freedom to exercise religion as limited to “closely-held” corporations. In ruling that
the three closely-held corporations before it had the legal power to exercise religion, the Court
looked to state law sources equally applicable to public companies.

Second, throughout the proposed rules – and in the background material preceding it −
the term “for-profit” is used. The Court and Justice Ginsburg in Hobby Lobby also used that
term for ease of reference and to distinguish “non-profit” corporations. In fact, the Oklahoma
3

Id. at *15-16.

4

As addressed later in this letter, some states do have special “close corporation” statutory provisions, but
those were not involved in Hobby Lobby and are only very infrequently even used.
5

See, e.g., Mod. Bus. Corp. Act §8.01 (referring to §7.32).

3

corporation statute involved in the Hobby Lobby case does not use that term; nor does the
Delaware corporate statute or the widely adopted Model Business Corporation Act.

The

standard terminology is “business corporation.” This term better captures the related statutory
fact that state corporate codes do not require that business corporations pursue profits at the
expense of competing considerations, a point explicitly noted by the Court and central to its
reasoning.6

Third, throughout the proposed rules – and in the background material preceding it − the
Hobby Lobby opinion is misdescribed as grounded on the “owners’” religious beliefs. The
Court, of course, held that the corporations themselves had a free exercise right. Prior to even
addressing the issue of whether a business corporation could “exercise religion,” the Court had to
decide – which it did – that such a corporation was, in its own right, a “person” under RFRA. As
a matter of state corporate law, moreover, “owners” or “shareholders” (in corporate businesses)
are not legally identical to the corporation itself and they neither formulate a corporation’s
business policies nor direct the business and affairs of a corporation.7 That function belongs to
the board of directors in all states. See Del. Code tit 8 §141(a); Model Business Corporation Act
§8.01(a). Thus the question of whether a business corporation will or will not “exercise religion”
is a question to be resolved by the board of directors under state law, not shareholders. A board
of directors acts in only one of two ways: either at a meeting where, if a quorum is present,
decisions are made by a majority vote – unanimity is not required − or alternatively, a board may
6

2014 WL 2921709 at *15. See Ronald J. Colombo, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE BUSINESS
CORPORATION (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2015); Ronald J. Colombo, The Naked Private Square, 51
HOUSTON L. REV. 1 (2013).
7

Shareholders are not “owners” of the corporation. The corporation holds legal title to and owns its own
assets, and shareholders own only the corporation’s stock. The distinction is important because ownership of the
corporation could imply stronger control and financial rights than state corporation law actually provides to
shareholders.

4

act without meeting if all directors sign an appropriate written consent.

No shareholder

involvement is necessary or required when a board so acts. Few indeed are the matters on which
shareholders are permitted to vote or consent under state corporate law: electing and removing
directors, amending the articles of incorporation and bylaws, and voting on mergers, sales, and
so on. Beyond that, shareholders have no role in directing a corporation’s business and affairs.

The persons involved in the Hobby Lobby Stores corporation in the Hobby Lobby case
made this clear in arguing that they “cannot in good conscience direct their corporations to
provide insurance coverage for the four drugs,…” (emphasis added).

That directors, not

shareholders, are the key decision-makers in business corporations is a basic and uniform state
corporate law principle of the type relied on by the Court in Hobby Lobby and in numerous cases
prior to that.

See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U. S. 69, 91 (1987) (“the

corporation…owes its existence and attributes to state law”); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U. S. 471, 478
(1979). A federal administrative agency has no legal authority to somehow engraft onto state
corporate law the requirement of shareholder consent (unanimous or otherwise) to corporate
action when underlying state law imposes no such obligation. The cases cited above, including
Hobby Lobby itself, recognize that state law alone determines the core features of business
corporations.

B.

Because, as a matter of state law and the reasoning of the Supreme Court in

Hobby Lobby, any business corporation may exercise religion in its business operations if the
board of directors elects and follows through on that course of action,8 the proposed rules should

8

That policy decision might be set forth in a board-adopted “Vision Statement,” “Statement of Values,” or it
could be expressed in the corporation’s articles of incorporation or bylaws. If a majority of shareholders acts, they

5

not categorically exclude certain types of corporations from the definition of “eligible
organizations.” The rules might, of course, create a “safe harbor” – one, however, that should
give wide berth – for certain types of corporations, but they should still permit other corporations
(and entities) to obtain an exemption. If a numerical limit on the number of shareholders is
chosen as one factor for the safe harbor it should be a large number, such as the threshold for
reporting obligations under the federal securities laws – i.e., 2,000 shareholders. Thus, the safe
harbor could and should, with respect to that specific factor, define “eligible organization” as any
corporation that is not a publicly reporting company under federal securities laws, the board of
directors of which has determined will exercise religion in its business affairs.

II.

Approaches to Avoid in Rulemaking
A.

Although the three companies in the Hobby Lobby litigation were “family owned”

(indirectly), there is no principled basis for limiting “eligible organization” to such types of
companies.

That descriptor – “family owned” – is unknown to state business law and is

irrelevant to it. To provide an example, a company the stock of which is owned and the affairs
of which are directed by ten Olson family members is not any more able to “exercise religion” in
its business affairs than a company the stock of which is owned and the affairs of which are
directed by one Olson family member and one Steinheimer family member.

This comment is an extension of the view set forth in Part I above. Just as general state
corporation laws apply equally to public and private corporations so too they apply equally to
“family owned” and non family-owned companies.
too can employ bylaw amendments to cause the corporation to exercise religion – or to influence how it does so – if
the board does not do so. See Alan J. Meese and Nathan B. Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory of
the Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations are RFRA Persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. FOR. 273, 281-83 (2014).

6

B.

There is no principled basis for limiting “eligible organizations” to corporations

organized as “benefit corporations” or as statutory close corporations.

None of the three

corporations involved in Hobby Lobby was organized as a benefit corporation (a form of
organization available only since 2010) or under a special close corporation statute.
Pennsylvania, the state of incorporation of Conestoga Wood Specialties, Inc., a party in Hobby
Lobby, has such a statute (19 Pa. Code ch. 27), but Conestoga Wood was not organized under it.
The Court in Hobby Lobby in no way required such a limitation because it is simply an option
under state law, not a requirement.

In fact, close corporation statutory elections are so

infrequently made that several years ago the American Bar Association’s Section on Business
Law withdrew such a supplement from its Model Business Corporation Act. On principles of
federalism and the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Hobby Lobby, there is no legal warrant for the
proposed rules to so radically limit eligibility. Such an approach would simply be a back door ex
post way to try to avoid the full reach of the binding Supreme Court ruling in Hobby Lobby.9
The same is true for any approach seeking to tie the definition of “eligible organization” to the
rules or statutes of any particular state, whether Delaware or any other state. Each state has the
undoubted legal authority to specify the attributes of corporateness for companies organized
under its laws. No single state’s corporate laws directly or indirectly (via HHS rules) should
become the federal law for all others on this important issue, especially since Congress itself has
steadfastly refused to adopt a federal corporation statute.

C.

Any approach to rulemaking that is grounded on supposed concerns about

director or officer fiduciary duties is irrelevant to sound rules. It is not within HHS authority to
9

For critiques of a failed pre-Hobby Lobby effort to deny that business corporations have RFRA rights, see
Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the Corporate Law Professors’ Amicus Brief in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga
Wood, 100 Virginia Law Review Online 1 (2014); Meese and Oman, supra note 8.

7

address fiduciary duty issues, a matter of state law and one that necessarily is fact-sensitive and
thus one uniquely suited for judicial resolution. Moreover, boards of directors have enormous
discretion in making decisions and, among other matters, need not heed or follow the
recommendations of shareholders. They are free to – indeed they must – exercise their own
independent business judgment. Shareholder votes or consents standing alone are, as noted in
Part I, of no legal force under general corporate statutes that uniformly place plenary decisionmaking power in the board of directors.

D.

The proposed rules should not require unanimous shareholder (or other owner)

consent because neither Hobby Lobby nor state corporate law principles require such a highly
unusual requirement. The Supreme Court stated that business corporations, “with ownership
approval, support a wide variety of charitable causes.”10 And the Court also said, “So long as its
owners agree,”11 a corporation may deviate from profit maximization.12 One might be tempted
to construe the words “with ownership approval” and “so long as owners agree” as implying that
all must so agree. But that simply is not what those passages say or mean. Nowhere does the
Court use the words “all” or “unanimous” or anything like them. Justice Alito, in this portion of
the opinion, is not addressing the nuances of the voting rules for shareholders under state
corporate law, which, in any event, are governed by a majoritarian principle, not rules of
unanimity.

10

2014 WL 2921709 at *15.

11

Id.

12

Of course, under state law a corporation can make charitable contributions without any shareholder
involvement; that too is a matter for the board of directors. This and numerous other points emphasizing board of
director authority in the post-Hobby Lobby context are elaborated by Professor Brett McDonnell. Brett McDonnell,
The Liberal Case for Hobby Lobby, forthcoming on SSRN.

8

Moreover, in responding to Justice Ginsberg’s dissent, Justice Alito explicitly takes up
the question of “disputes among the owners of corporations.”13 He acknowledges that “the
owners of a company might well have a dispute relating to religion.”14 If so, then necessarily all
shareholders do not agree on business policy and unanimity thereby is lacking. But that does not
mean that, lacking unanimous agreement, the business cannot exercise religion.
precisely what Justice Alito then notes:

It means

“State corporate law provides a ready means for

resolving any conflicts by, for example, dictating how a corporation can establish its governing
structure.… Courts will turn to that structure and the underlying state law in resolving
disputes.”15 And as noted, the default voting rule in corporate governance is a lower threshold
than unanimity. The treatise to which Alito cites at this point in his opinion refers, quite
conventionally, to “simple majority vote.”16

Further, as noted in Part I above, on questions of business policy, including charitable
contributions and strategic and operational decisions that sacrifice profits for other
considerations – whether to exercise religion or otherwise − shareholders ordinarily have no
voting rights at all. It is for the board of directors to decide such questions, and even in the
boardroom unanimity is not required. If the shareholders disagree with a board-level decision,
their primary recourse will be to act to remove directors at the annual election of directors or at a
special meeting held for that purpose. Absent an unusual charter or by-law provision, directors

13

2014 WL 2921709 at *19.

14

Id. Justice Alito cites as an example some stockholders wishing to remain open on the Sabbath to make
more money while other stockholders might want to close for religious reasons. Id.
15

Id.

16

Id.
See Alan Meese, Hobby Lobby, Shareholder Primacy and
www.theconglomerate.org, July 17, 2014 (unanimity by shareholders is not necessary).

9

Profit

Maximization,

are the key decision-makers in corporations and neither they nor shareholders (where they do get
to vote) must act with unanimity.

In short, by acting appropriately through the legally mandated corporate governance
structure, a majority of directors will chart business policy.17 One aspect of this is deciding how,
if at all, religious or other philosophical or social policy beliefs will play a role in shaping that
strategy. As the key decisionmakers address that question, the usual default governance and
majoritarian voting rules will apply, not a highly-unusual unanimity rule that would obtain only
if specifically agreed ex ante. The decision to engage in − or refrain from − non-maximizing of
profits behavior of all sorts, including the exercise of religion through business affairs, will thus
be decided in the customary way under standard corporate law rules.
Very truly yours,
Lyman Johnson
Robert O. Bentley Professor of Law
Washington and Lee University
School of Law
Lexington, VA
and Professor of Law
University of St. Thomas
School of Law
Minneapolis, MN
johnsonlp@wlu.edu
David Millon
J. B. Stombock Professor of Law
Washington and Lee University
School of Law
Lexington, VA
(Additional signatures on following page)

17

See generally, Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance,
97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2002).
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Stephen M. Bainbridge
William D. Warren Distinguished
Professor of Law
UCLA School of Law
Los Angeles, CA
Ronald J. Colombo
Associate Dean for Academic Affairs
and Professor of Law
Maurice A. Deane School of Law
at Hofstra University
Hempstead, NY
Brett McDonnell
Professor of Law
University of Minnesota Law School
Minneapolis, MN
Alan J. Meese
Ball Professor of Law
and Cabell Research Professor
William and Mary Law School
Williamsburg, VA
Nathan B. Oman
Robert and Elizabeth Scott Professor
William and Mary Law School
Williamsburg, VA
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